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I. INTRODUCTION
Expanding regulatory and business pressures have greatly increased the demand for and the sophistication of effective internal control monitoring (ICM) (Coderre 2006; PwC 2006b ). The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) asserts that improved ICM practices should enhance the efficiency, effectiveness and assurance of internal control processes (COSO 2009a) . 1 In January 2009, COSO (2009a COSO ( , 2009b COSO ( , 2009c issued guidance on ICM and observed that firms often struggle with realizing the benefits of ICM-related activities. The purpose of the current study is to examine the potential benefits that firms can realize from implementing ICM technology designed to support and facilitate internal control processes.
While the concept of ICM is theoretically valuable, we are unaware of any objective evidence documenting the benefits asserted by COSO and others. Our analysis is also motivated by practitioners who argue that it is unclear whether the implementation of various information technology initiatives yields the intended benefits (Standish Group 2004; Dewan et al. 2007; ITGI 2008b) . External audit partners too have reservations about of the benefits of audit-related information technology (Behn et al. 2006) . Thus, the current study holds relevance and importance to multiple stakeholders.
Our research questions involve the internal and external assurance benefits, if any, associated with the implementation of ICM technology initiatives. We develop and test hypotheses for three explicit potential benefits associated with internal and external assurance outcomes: 1) more effective internal control systems, 2) enhanced audit efficiency, and 3) timely audit reporting. We identify 139 announcements of ICM technology purchases across the time period [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . Our control group consists of all available observations listed in Audit Analytics SOX 404 Internal Controls database during the same periods.
Consistent with our hypotheses, we document positive associations between ICM technology initiatives and subsequently stronger internal controls (i.e., lower likelihood of material weaknesses), enhanced audit efficiency (i.e., smaller increases in audit fees) and timely audit reports (i.e., smaller increases audit report delays). Collectively, our main results suggest that ICM technology yields important benefits in both internal and external assurance outcomes. In some of our tests (i.e., audit report delays), our findings suggest transformativeoriented ICM technology initiatives yield greater assurance benefits compared to complianceoriented ICM initiatives.
Our study makes three primary contributions to the accounting and auditing communities of researchers, practitioners, and regulators. First, to our knowledge, ours is the first study to document economically significant benefits consistent with COSO's assertions that formal ICM activities enhance the strength of internal control systems and the efficiency of external examinations of such internal control systems. 2 Given the steep costs of reporting material internal control weaknesses (Gupta and Nayar 2007; Hammersley et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2009 ) and unprecedented rise in assurance costs (Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Krishnan et al. 2008) in the post-SOX environment, our results suggest that ICM technology can help to mitigate such costs.
3 Second, our study contributes to the literature in accounting information systems (AIS) by documenting specific benefits associated with strategically focused information technology (IT). Prior AIS research documents mixed results with respect to the benefits of IT implementations (e.g., Tam 1998; Hunton et al. 2003; Kobelsky et al. 2008) , pointing out that the economic benefits deriving from IT can be elusive (Dehning and Richardson 2002; Melville et al. 2004) , partly due to commonly used aggregate performance measures (e.g., ROA) that capture only a part of the benefits generated by IT-related initiatives. In contrast to prior research that focuses on linking broad IT initiatives to broad outcomes (e.g., Hayes et al. 2001; Hitt et al. 2002; Dehning et al. 2003; Hunton et al. 2003; Kobelsky et al. 2008) , our study advances this stream of literature by investigating three distinct (non-mutually exclusive) targeted assurance benefits of a specific-use IT. In so doing, we address the call from the ITGA (2005) to document measures of IT benefits that might otherwise be unobserved by traditional financial measures.
Finally, our study enhances the IT-related auditing literature. Some research in this area focuses on the use of IT by auditors and the effect of IT on auditors' judgments (e.g., Messier 1995; O'Donnell and David 2000; Brazel et al. 2004; O'Donnell and Schultz 2003; Bible et al. 2005; Bedard et al. 2007; Dowling and Leech, 2007; Dowling 2009 ). Other research involves field-based surveys that describe assurance providers' perceptions about the importance and benefits of using audit-related IT (e.g., Fischer 1996; Behn et al. 2006; Janvrin et al. 2008) . There is relatively little archival research in auditing regarding the benefits of assurance-related IT. With the exception of Banker et al. (2002) , who investigate the extent in which external auditors' investments in IT are associated with audit firm productivity, we are unaware of any archival studies concerning the impact of an auditee's (as opposed to auditor's) implementation of assurance-related technologies.
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II. BACKGROUND Internal Control Monitoring and the Use of Technology
Our examination is partially motivated by recent concerns about unprecedented compliance costs and challenges associated with SOX internal control requirements.
Specifically, in the revision to its standard for auditing internal controls over financial reporting, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) expressed unease about greater than expected assurance expenditures and inefficient initiatives related to complying with SOX Section 404 (PCAOB 2007) . In response to these concerns, COSO recently issued improved guidance on the use of ICM, noting that many companies were not making the best use of "ongoing monitoring" practices, which in turn may have caused inefficient internal control evaluations (COSO 2009a) .
COSO defines the role of ICM as ensuring that internal control continues to operate effectively by promoting good control operations, and enhancing the process of assessing the design and operation of controls (COSO 2009a) . By making ICM a priority, organizations can drive their compliance efforts, identify processing errors, and proactively detect fraud (Ernst & Young 2007) . Information technology plays an essential role in the success of ICM implementation. In this light, the SEC has an interest in whether companies have been able to use technology to gain efficiency in evaluating the effectiveness of internal controls (ITGI 2006) . COSO explicitly identifies the use of IT as a tool to enhance ICM either through specific "control monitoring tools" or "process management tools." ICM technology encompasses a range of control monitoring tasks, including the automation of routine control tests, enhanced risk assessments, evaluation and documentation of controls, and managing and communicating control assurance activities (COSO 2009b) . The goal of ICM is to enhance the overall visibility of the organization to risk and performance through the effective use of technology (KPMG 2008) .
To investigate the potential outcomes of ICM as related to assurance outcomes, we identified a sample of firms that implemented specific ICM technology in response to the internal control requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). These specific SOX-related tools include many features consistent with the monitoring-related activities, such as the ability to visually map business processes, risk, and internal control information across disparate financial and reporting systems. Firms are also able to maintain comprehensive firm-wide control documentation and automatically monitor workflow status, audit trails, and compliance processes in real time. Among their many designs, these products aim to monitor and prevent internal control weaknesses, provide comprehensive and timely enterprise wide documentation, and maintain information and security integrity, all of which support the role of internal control monitoring objectives (COSO 2009a (COSO , 2009b .
Measuring ICM Technology Benefits
Although AIS and related general information systems literature attempts to address the prior issues by measuring the business value of IT; however, archival evidence regarding the benefit of IT has not always been easy to find. 5 Part of the difficulty lies in the fact that researchers have attempted to link broad IT implementations to broad financial measures of either stock market reaction (e.g., Hayes et al. 2001; Dehning et al. 2003) or firm profitability (e.g., Hitt et al. 2002; Hunton et al. 2003; Kobelsky et al. 2008) . The ITGI (2005) notes that traditional performance methods, such as return on investment (ROI), reflect constrained views of IT indirect benefits. As such, they emphasize the importance of measuring direct benefits in order to fully understand how IT contributes to the achievement of business goals.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and ITGI note the failure or difficulty faced by firms in measuring or quantifying the benefits of IT-related control initiatives (PwC 2006b , ITGI 2003 . These two constituencies observe that when companies measure the performance of IT activities related to control, they limit the measurement to whether a particular technology is in place, as opposed to whether the technology produces beneficial outcomes such as cost savings and risk avoidance. The current study takes an approach of measuring potential outcomes of IT initiatives by considering explicit benefits associated with ICM technology as represented by internal assurance outcomes (i.e., internal control system strength) and external assurance outcomes (i.e., audit efficiency and audit timeliness).
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Internal Control Effectiveness
Subsequent to SOX, many studies have focused on the determinants and impact of internal control material weaknesses. Ge and McVay (2005) investigate disclosures of material weaknesses in internal controls and find that weak internal controls are associated with insufficient investment of resources in accounting controls. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.
(2007) and Doyle et al. (2007) also document factors, including organizational complexity, major firm changes, and inadequate resources, which are common to the risk of disclosing internal control weaknesses. In turn, Gupta and Nayar (2007) and Hammersley et al. (2008) find that the market penalizes firms that do not adequately address the above risk factors by imposing negative stock price reactions in response to disclosures of internal control weaknesses, particularly if the information describing the weakness is vague and the weaknesses are less "auditable." Despite the importance of meeting the SOX internal control requirements, we know of few studies that investigate the specific strategies used by companies to monitor and assure the effectiveness of internal controls.
Given the potential importance of tools that alleviate the risk associated with internal control weaknesses and the severity of penalties for weak internal controls, we investigate the association between implementations of ICM technology and material control weaknesses.
Consistent with many of the functions of ICM technology, described earlier, its purported principal contribution includes the management of risks through the monitoring of a firm's internal controls. ICM technology products focus on guiding the overall process for monitoring and assuring compliance with the SOX Section 404 requirements. Specific functions include the central data repository, responsibility assignment, communication, scheduling, and signing-off of applicable control tests and SOX tasks. These features allow management and assurance teams a greater level of confidence regarding the status of a firm's internal control over financial reporting.
Consistent with the COSO's description of the monitoring process, the aforementioned technology can also represent specific internal control activities (COSO 2009a). These features often include processes for establishing security policies, activities for upholding information integrity, monitoring tools for managing business systems and risk, screens for alerting accounting irregularities, and tools for maintaining segregation of duties.
Collectively, effective implementation of ICM technology should improve firms' prospects for avoiding internal control weaknesses. As such, we predict the following hypothesis:
H1: Firms implementing ICM technology will exhibit a lower likelihood of experiencing material internal control weaknesses subsequent to ICM technology implementation.
Even though this directional hypothesis follows intuitively from the features of ICM technology, it is unclear whether such IT implementations would actually yield subsequent benefits. As discussed earlier, an ongoing challenge for managers has been the ability to measure IT-related initiatives in terms of outcomes (e.g., effective internal control monitoring). Likewise, IT research finds tremendous failure rates of many IT initiatives, with one estimate suggesting that less than 8 percent of IT budgets are actually spent on initiatives that bring benefits to the enterprise (ITGI 2008b).
Audit Efficiency
Many of the touted features of ICM technology aim directly at the role of external assurance providers and "cost-effective" ways to improve the efficiency of complying with the expanded integrated audit requirements of SOX. For example, COSO (2009b) asserts:
"A properly designed and executed monitoring program helps support external certifications … because it provide persuasive information that internal control operated effectively at a point in time or during a specific period" (49).
Likewise, "…organizations might be able to enhance the efficiency of external parties' work by directing them to portions of its monitoring procedures they might use, or by making modifications to its monitoring program to better facilitate external parties' work" To the extent that ICM technology can effectively aid the efficiency of the external assurance process and evidence collection, we should also see corresponding alleviations of the increases in audit effort brought on during the SOX time period studied, leading to greater audit efficiency and audit costs containment, as next posited:
H2: Firms implementing ICM technology will exhibit smaller increases in audit fees subsequent to ICM technology implementation.
Despite the consistent emphasis on audit efficiency embedded in the COSO's conceptual description of ICM activities, it remains an empirical question as to whether such technology initiatives would actually yield assurance cost-savings. Although prior studies used field-based approaches to describe the external auditors' perceptions about the use of audit-related IT (Fischer 1996; Janvrin et al. 2008) , to our knowledge, ours is one of the first study to provide archival evidence regarding external audit cost outcomes from the client's implementation of assurance-related technology.
Audit Timeliness
We also ask whether ICM technology impacts assurance outcomes by considering the timeliness of audit reports (i.e., days from fiscal year-end to external audit report date).
During the time period under study, firms faced burgeoning audit delays as a result of increased audit requirements. Ettredge et al. (2006) In contrast to the above hypothesis, Behn et al. (2006) find that audit partners do not systematically view technology aids as key determinants of constraints on audit delays (lags).
This view is in contrast to the direct benefits touted by ICM technology initiatives. Rather, Behn et al. (2006) find that audit partners associate changes in personnel resources, professional mindsets, auditor skill-sets, and scheduling as key determinants of audit delays (lags). Thus, it is unclear whether such tools will result in significant associations with audit report delays. However, to the extent that ICM technology implementations offset the laborintensive process of SOX compliance, we should see an indirect alleviation of impediments resulting from personnel resources, required auditor skills, and scheduling flexibility, thereby mitigating audit delays.
The Strategic Nature of ICM Technology
Prior research has shown that the benefits of IT are conditioned upon the strategic nature of the investment on the firm (Chatterjee et al. 2001; Dehning et al. 2003) . Dehning et al. (2003) classify the IT strategic role into three categories: H4: ICM technology transformative implementations will exhibit greater impacts on assurance outcomes than ICM technology compliance implementations.
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN Sample Selection
To identify firms that implemented ICM technology, we collect announcements of firms implementing technology that is explicitly targeted at monitoring and assuring compliance with SOX internal control requirements through public sources, such as LexisNexis news and PR newswire. Our search uses keywords searches such as "SOX information [ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 7 In an effort not to lose observations due to missing data, every time the value of any variable was missing in compustat for our treatment firms, we replace the missing value with the sample mean. Three treatment firms were impacted by these changes with no impact on the results. 8 As discussed in the sensitivity tests section, we also re-estimate our models using a matched pair design and find that our inferences remain the same. 9 We implemented this requirement to maximize the number of firms that issued a Section 404 report, particularly in the early years of our sample period. For accelerated files (large firms for the most part), compliance with section 404 came into effect in November 15 th 2004. However, for non-accelerated files, the compliance date was December 15 th 2007.
Model Specifications
Internal Assurance Benefits
To test H1, we construct a material control weakness regression model following Doyle et al. (2007) . Our first OLS regression model is as follows: 
We define Weaknesses as the number of material weaknesses reported in a firm's 404 reports.
Since IT implementations typically exhibit lags prior to producing the expected benefits 10 Following Dehning et al. (2003) , two authors of this study independently coded the ICM technology implementations into comply and transform by carefully scrutinizing press release announcements with a 95 percent concordance. Any differences were resolved in face-to-face discussions. 11 In untabulated analysis, we find that SOX ICM Comply firms do not differ from SOX ICM Transform firms. We compare these two types of firms along the same dimensions reported in Table 3 .
We control for firm size (Assets) and age (Firm Age) by using the natural logarithm of total assets and the number of years the firm has been trading in a stock exchange, Growth), and pre-tax restructuring charge scaled by market value of equity (Restructuring).
Finally, we include a trend (Trend) variable capturing overall macro-economic effects (e.g., Adut et al. 2003; Brazel and Dang 2008) . As stated above, with the exception of Trend, the control variables and their expected directional effects are modeled after Doyle et al. (2007) . 12 We present more detailed definitions of the control variables in equation (1) in Table 2 .
[
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
External Assurance Outcomes
To test H2, we examine whether the observed large increases in audit fees during the Post-SOX time period were constrained by the implementation of SOX-related ICM technology. We adapt the audit fee model of Raghunandan and Rama (2006) for our audit fee tests using the following OLS change model: 
Audit Fees represents the total audit fees incurred by the firm as reported in Audit Analytics.
Our tests require estimating and comparing the changes in audit fees for firms implementing SOX-related ICM technology compared to our control firms. Thus, Δ Audit Fees t+1 measures the percentage change in audit fees from the year of implementation to the year after implementation. We expect a negative sign on the SOX ICM coefficients. Given the pervasive increases in audit fees experienced by our sample, a negative coefficient would imply that the implementation of ICM technology is associated with a reduction in subsequent audit fee increases. Assets, Foreign Transactions, Segments and Trend are defined as in the previous model. We define Receivables and Inventory and Liquidity as the ratio of the sum of net account receivables and inventory to total assets and the ratio of total current assets to total current liabilities, respectively. We also control for Leverage and return on assets (ROA) defined as the ratio of total debt (net income) to total assets. We include indicator variables coded 1 if: the auditor issues a going concern opinion (Going Concern), the auditor is a big N auditor (Big 4), and the firm reported a material control weakness (Weakness); all such variables are coded 0 otherwise. Consistent with the measurement of the dependent variable, we measure all continuous (indicator) independent variables in equation (2) in percent changes (changes). We draw directional expectations consistent with generally accepted audit fee research (e.g., Raghunandan and Rama 2006) . Consistent with the dependent variable, we measure all continuous (indicator) independent variables in equation (3) in percent changes (changes). We draw directional expectations consistent with generally accepted audit fee research (e.g., Ettredge et al. 2006) . Table 2 presents more detailed definitions of the control variables in equation (3).
Extended Models
The models specified in equations (1), (2), and (3) represent our baseline models and are largely constructed following prior literature (i.e., Doyle et al. 2007; Ettredge et al. 2006; Raghunandan and Rama 2006) . In an effort to test the robustness of our results, we extend these baseline models in three ways. First, while the independent variables in each of our equations largely overlap each other, non-overlapping variables (e.g., Restatement) may affect other assurance outcomes such as material weaknesses or audit fees. Hence, to ascertain that our tests are robust to additional potentially important variables, we extend our models to capture these factors.
Secondly, it is possible that our ICM technology (SOX ICM) variable is correlated with overall financial reporting quality. Failing to control for this possibility could yield biased estimates. 13 We consider this possibility and control for financial reporting quality using the absolute level of performance-matched discretionary accruals (Absolute Accruals).
Higher levels of Absolute Accruals (estimated following Kothari et al. 2005 ) are likely to be associated with lower financial reporting quality (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008 ).
14 Third, firms that implement ICM technology may "self-select" into this group, and those variables that predict the decision to implement ICM technology might also affect the dependent variables examined in our analysis. This potential condition presents an omitted variable problem (Heckman 1979) . In addition, some of our treatment firms may have chosen to implement ICM technology while taking steps to increase the coordination of their internal and external assurance efforts. This potential condition presents a simultaneity issue.
Assuming either of these cases, our estimates could be biased and inconsistent. To control for these issues, we follow the Heckman (1979) 
With the exception of IT Intensity, defined as the yearly industry (measured at the two-SIC code) median of IT spending scaled by total assets, all other variables are as defined previously (please note that our IT spending data stops in 2005). Equation (4) is estimated using 12,161 firm-year observations with complete data (125 of which are ICM technology firms). We find a positive association (p < 0.10 or better, one-tail test) between the decision 13 We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this possibility. 14 We also consider an additional proxy for financial reporting quality: the permanence of cash flows from operations (CFO Permanence) (Guay and Hartford 2000) , defined as the difference between the average of cash flow from operations in years t and t+1 and average of cash flow from operations in years t-1 and t-2. However, CFO Permanence was insignificant in all of our models, so we do not tabulate these results for parsimony.
to implement ICM technology (SOX ICM) and BankruptcyRisk, Leverage and Audit Fees.
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These results suggest that prior firm performance and audit assurance levels have an impact on the decision to implement ICM technology. Using the estimation results from equation (4), we then construct the inverse Mills ratio (Heckman) and use it as an additional explanatory variable in our extended tests. In an alternate specification of equation (4), we also use prior weaknesses as a predictor of ICM technology (SOX ICM) implementation. We find similar results but lose a large number of treatment observations. To maximize our observations we utilize Audit Fees to capture additional risk factors and assurance strategies in the lagged period. 16 We also contrasted all of these variables at year t (implementation year) finding similar patterns. Models heading within the research design section, it is possible that lagged audit assurance efforts are associated with the decision to implement ICM technology. We consider this possibility by controlling for self-section through the Heckman variable. Table 4 reports the mean increases in audit fees for the SOX ICM firms decelerates significantly (p <0 .05) from the year prior to implementation (76.2 percent increase) to the year of (48.1 percent increase) and subsequent year (24.0 percent increase). 18 We estimate (but not tabulate for parsimony) correlations amongst all the variables to find that, as predicted, the SOX ICM variable is negatively related to subsequent material weaknesses, audit fee increases and audit delay increases (p <0.05 or better). We also find the theoretically correlations levels between other control variables. Additionally, we estimated VIFs in all of our models and found that these do not exceed 2.0, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem. 19 As noted in Panel A (and to a lesser extend in panels B and C), we lose approximately 60% of our sample firms in year t-1, which may affect the analysis. The large loss of observations for both treatment and control firms is due to the fact that many firms do not provide a 404 report in year t-1 or t. There is a visible deceleration of audit fee increases for control firms, but the differences are not as dramatic. When we contrast SOX ICM firms and control firms, we find that audit fee increases differ between the two types of firms only in the post-period (p < 0.01). The pattern of differences is consistent with H2, which proposes that SOX ICM bolsters audit efficiency as proxied by constraints on increasing audit fees.
V. RESULTS
Univariate Analyses
Panel B in
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Panel C in Table 4 reports the mean audit report delays increase. We observe similar patterns to those reported for audit fee increases. For the SOX ICM firms, the mean increase in audit delays decreases significantly (p < 0.05) from the year prior to implementation (35.1 percent increase) to the year of (17 percent increase) and subsequent year (5.5 percent increase). Control firms experience a decrease in audit delay increases, but the decrease is not as large. We find that audit delay increases differ between SOX ICM firms and control firms only in the post-implementation year (p < 0.05).
Overall, the univariate tests suggest that, with the exception of control weaknesses, SOX ICM firms and control firms do not significantly differ from one another prior to the period of ICM technology implementation with respect to audit fee increases or audit delay increases. However, for each of the variables considered, SOX ICM firms display stronger internal (control weaknesses) and external (audit fee and audit delay efficiencies) assurance outcomes in the year after the ICM Technology. Table 5 reports the results of the associations between SOX ICM technology and the likelihood of a reported material weakness in the year after implementation. Columns (1) -(3) report the results aggregating all SOX ICM technology into one bucket (SOX ICM). As one moves from columns (1) to (3), the model increases in the amount of control variables included. To illustrate, the least restrictive model (column 1) is adapted from Doyle et al. (2007) and represents our baseline model, whereas the most restrictive model (column 3) includes all variables identified in Doyle et al. (2007) plus variables posited to affect the reporting of control weaknesses (e.g., restatements) and a correction for self-selection (Heckman) . 20 The models reported in columns (4) - (6) Restructurings, and in some cases, Mergers). 22 We do not find any associations between 20 As we discuss more fully in the sensitivity tests section, only in approximately 12% of the firm-year observations is at least one weakness reported; a percentage consistent with Doyle et al. (2007) . We examine the potential bias introduced by the large proportion of "zeroes" in the dependent variable using various econometric techniques including the estimation of truncated and Tobit models. As discussed later, these alternate ways of testing our prediction yields similar results. We also modeled the likelihood of having a weakness using a probit model and find similar results. 21 To complement this result, for every SOX ICM technology firm that reported at least one material weakness, we searched for evidence of remediation in the subsequent year. We find that more than 60% of the SOX ICM treatment firms remediated the weaknesses reported. We contrast these results against a sample of 100 similarly sized control firms and find that out of the firms that reported a weakness, 44% remediated their weaknesses in the subsequent year. We find that the material weaknesses remediated for the SOX ICM treatment sample is significantly greater than the material weaknesses remediated for the control sample, which is generally consistent with H1. 22 We include Trend in every model to control for overall economic factors (Brazel and Dang 2008; Adut et al. 2003) . The negative and significant coefficient in Trend implies an increasing (at a decreasing rate) trend in the material weaknesses and Firm Age and Extreme Sales Growth. Columns (2) and (5) consider other variables that may impact the likelihood of reporting a material weakness. We find that
Multivariate Analyses
Restatements, Going Concern and Audit Fees are positively associated with the likelihood of reporting a material weakness. We also consider Absolute Accruals, finding a positive association with the likelihood of reporting a material weakness, a result consistent with Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) . In the models shown in columns (3) and (6), we control for potential self-selection bias through the Heckman variable, finding that, while significant (suggesting the presence of self-selection), our primary results remain unchanged. Audit fees and our proxy for financial reporting quality variables (Absolute Accruals) are not in the models reported in columns (3) and (6) because we use lagged versions of these variables in the estimation of the Heckman variable.
23 Tables 6 and 7 report the associations between our SOX ICM variables and our external assurance outcomes, namely audit fees and audit delays. Table 3 (i.e., the reporting material control weakness, and each of the other two dependent variables, increases at a decreasing rate from years t-1 to year t+1). We also estimate our models using year fixed-effects and our inferences remain unchanged. In addition, we estimate our models on a year-by-year basis and generally find similar results. 23 Lennox and Francis (2008) emphasize the importance of ascertaining that the insertion of the inverse Mills ratio (Heckman) in the main model does not cause unduly multicollinearity as a result of violations of "exclusion restrictions" (see Lennox and Francis for more details on this). We find that VIFs after including Heckman in our main models do not exceed 1.50, suggesting that Heckman serves as an important control for self-selection without introducing bias in our analysis.
incrementally influence audit fee increases. The control variables are generally consistent with those reported by Raghunandan and Rama (2006) and audit delay increases. Finally, the positive and significant coefficient on Heckman suggests the presence of self-selection.
[ INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] Overall, our main multivariate results are consistent with the notion that ICM technology implementations yield benefits realized in both internal (i.e., lower likelihood of material weaknesses) and external (i.e., lower audit fee increases and lower audit delay increases) assurance outcomes. We find limited evidence (only in the case of audit delays)
that the strategic role of the ICM technology made a significant difference.
Robustness Tests
Alternate Control Group
Our research design includes all firms in Audit Analytics that provide a Section 404 report in year t+1, and did not announce an ICM technology implementation, as control firms. A potential disadvantage of this procedure is that we are not comparing firms of similar characteristics. As described in Table 3 , ICM technology firms are different compared to the population in various characteristics like size and complexity of operations.
Accordingly, as an additional robustness check, we construct a matched-pair control group.
For every SOX ICM firm, we identify a match firm based on size (total assets), industry affiliation (at 2-digit SIC code), auditor (Big 4), and provision of a Section 404 report. We then re-estimate our main models. The (untabulated) regressions yield virtually identical results as those reported. Krishnan et al. (2008) document a positive association between the presence of a new CEO and the costs of complying with Section 404, implying that new CEOs can be viewed as "agents of change." Hence, it is possible that our results are influenced by CEO changes. To rule out this possibility, we determine if a CEO change occurred during the two-year period leading up to the IT implementation decision. To mitigate costly hand collection for our entire control group, we take advantage of our match-pair control group and identify CEO changes (in the current or prior two years) for each matched pair. Using this additional data, we also include New CEO, a variable that captures the impact a new CEO might have on the underlying improvement of the internal control environment and on the decision to implement ICM technology. Inclusion of the additional New CEO variable in our models does not change our primary results.
Management Changes and ICM Technology Implementation
Potential Simultaneity Between Dependent Variables
It is possible that weaknesses, audit fees, and audit delays are simultaneously determined. Our primary tests, control for this possibility by including audit fees (weaknesses) in the weaknesses and audit delays (audit fees and audit delays) models. As a further sensitivity test, we estimate our models under a two-stage (and three-stage) leastsquares framework to allow each of these variables to be simultaneously determined.
Consistent with our tabulated tests, we continue to find negative and significant associations (p < 0.05) between the SOX ICM technology variables and each of the dependent variables.
Potential Econometric Issues Related to Control Weakness Tests
As discussed in our research design section, we estimate OLS models when we examine the association between ICM technology and the number of material control weaknesses reported. As documented in prior research (Doyle et al. 2007 ) and corroborated in our analysis, less than 15 percent of firm-year observations are associated with a material control weakness. To mitigate the bias this low frequency may induce on our results, we conduct several tests. First, we re-estimate the models after excluding all "zero" observations (that is, we run a truncated regression), and find virtually the same result.
We also estimate a generalized Tobit model that incorporates the reporting of material weaknesses into two simultaneous steps: (1) the auditor's decision to establish that at least one material weakness exists (a first-stage probit model) and (2) 
Limitations
There are several limitations that could condition our ability to generalize results. As common among archival assurance and governance studies, we cannot rule out possibilities of omitted correlated variables. Specifically, it is possible that ICM technology (SOX ICM) is correlated with other decisions or efforts within firms that ultimately drive the assurance benefits documented in this study. For example, it is possible that our ICM technology firms were generally more aggressive in addressing the Section 404 requirements, through early efforts to curb control weaknesses or coordinate the internal and external assurance efforts.
Although our design of the models and robustness tests are aimed at alleviating the above conditions, we cannot conclusively rule them out.
As mentioned in the description of our extended models, our sample is constrained to disclosures of SOX-related ICM technology implementations. However, some firms may have chosen not to disclose their SOX ICM technology implementations. To the extent that the control sample includes firms that adopted SOX-related ICM technology, this would bias against finding significant results. Alternatively, those firms choosing to "announce" their IT implementations could also be subject to additional pressures to reap the benefits of their ICM technology. Although prior IT research finds positive reaction to announcements of IT investments (Dehning et al. 2003) , there is no evidence of guaranteed IT benefits resulting from "announcements." Nevertheless, our findings are subject to this possible influence.
Some of the benefits of ICM technology may also take an extended period of time to realize. Given the short sample period of time used in this study to measure the benefits, due to the recency of the SOX-related ICM technology, future research should be undertaken to ensure that the full measure of benefits are included to assess the impact of ICM technology.
We also recognize that our study only evaluates the potential benefits of SOX-related ICM technology and not the costs. Users of ICM technology should also consider the costs of such initiatives when attempting to measure the ultimate value of ICM technology. Future research should consider the challenges of measuring indirect costs (such as constraints on productivity or limits to user acceptance, among others) of ICM technology.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 has led firms to increase their level of resources committed to effective internal control monitoring. The current study takes an approach of measuring potential outcomes of internal control monitoring practices by considering explicit benefits associated with monitoring technology as represented by internal assurance outcomes (i.e., internal control system strength) and external assurance outcomes (i.e., audit efficiency and audit timeliness). Collectively, our study supports the benefit-related assertions embedded within the conceptual application of effective internal control monitoring practices.
Our study enhances current research and practice on numerous fronts. For the AIS researcher, our findings stress the importance of identifying objective-oriented metrics when assessing the benefits of technology implementations. This may be a reason why broad performance measures do not consistently show the expected returns to IT implementations (Dehning et al. 2007 ) and more specifically, why firms face difficulty in measuring or quantifying the benefits of IT-related control initiatives (PwC 2006b , ITGI 2003 .
Our The total number of material control weaknesses reported ("count_we" field in audit analytics).
Audit Fee Percent Change (calculated using the "matchfy_sum_audfees" field in audit analytics).
The number of days between the audit report date and the fiscal year end (using the "sig_date_of_op_s and fiscal_year_end_op" fields in audit analytics).
Test Variables
SOX ICM
An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm implemented SOX-related ICM technology and 0 otherwise.
SOX ICM Transform
An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm implemented SOX-related ICM technology that is transformational in nature and 0 otherwise.
SOX ICM Comply
An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm implemented SOX-related ICM technology that is intended to comply only and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables (alphabetic order)
Absolute Accruals
The absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals estimated following Kothari et al. (2005) .
Assets
The natural logarithm of total assets ("at" field in compustat).
Auditor Change
An indicator variable coded 1 if there is a change in auditors and 0 otherwise (auditors are identified using the "auditor_fkey" field in audit analytics).
Audit Fees
The natural logarithm of total audit fees ("matchfy_sum_audfees" field in audit analytics).
Bankruptcy Risk
The decile rank of Altman's Z score.
Big 4
An indicator variable if the firms auditor is a big 4 and 0 otherwise (big 4 auditors are identified using the "auditor_fkey" field in audit analytics).
Extreme Sales Growth
An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm's industry-adjusted sales growth is in the top quintile of the sample and 0 otherwise (calculated using the "sale" field in compustat). See Table 2 for a detailed definition of variables.
